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Abstract. This paper proposes a novel stream encryption scheme with avalanche eﬀect (SESAE). Using
this scheme and an ideal pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) to generate d-bit segment binary key
streams, one can encrypt a plaintext such that by using any key stream generated from a diﬀerent seed
to decrypt the ciphertext, the decrypted plaintext will become an avalanche-like text which has 2d − 1
consecutive one’s with a high probability. As a cost, the required bits of the ciphertext are d times those
of the plaintext. A corresponding avalanche-type encryption theorem is established. Two chaotic 12-bit
segment PRNGs are designed. A generalized FIPS140 test and SESAE test for the two chaotic PRNGs,
RC4 12-bit segment PRNG and 12-bit segment Matlab PRNG are implemented. The SESAE tests for
16-bit segment PRNGs are also compared. The results suggest that those PRNGs are able to generate the
SESAEs which are similar to those generated via ideal PRNGs.
1 Introduction
Chaos-based encryption techniques has received increas-
ing attention recently (see, for example, [1–3]). An
avalanche eﬀect refers to a special and desirable prop-
erty of cryptographic algorithms. In the case of quality
ciphers, the avalanche eﬀect means that a small change in
the key or in the plaintext will cause a drastic change in
the ciphertext just like an avalanche.
The term avalanche eﬀect was ﬁrst used in cryptogra-
phy by Feistel [4]. The original concept dates back to as
early as Shannon’s diﬀusion theory [5].
Forre [6] presented a strict avalanche criterion as a gen-
eralization of the early concept of avalanche eﬀect. Zhang
and Zheng [7] discussed a so-called global avalanche char-
acteristic. Castro et al. [8] introduced a strict avalanche
criterion for randomness test and used it to measure the
strengths of some well-known PRNGs in the literature.
Some detailed discussions on the avalanche criterion of
Boolean functions are given in [9].
The avalanche eﬀects in cryptography are classiﬁed
two types: plaintext avalanche and key avalanche. Strict
plaintext avalanche criterion requires that each bit of the
ciphertext block should have a change with the proba-
bility of one-half whenever any bit of the plaintext is
changed [10]. Strict key avalanche criterion requires that
each bit of the ciphertext block should have a change with
the probability of one-half whenever any bit of the key is
changed [10]. This paper will discuss the key avalanche
eﬀect.
a e-mail: minlequan@gmail.com
If one tosses a fair coin, there is a 1/2 probability that
one guesses correctly which side of the coin will be face-up.
If one tosses a fair polyhedron with 2d faces, there will be
only a 1/2d probability that one guesses correctly which
side of the polyhedron will be face-up.
Similarly to the fair polyhedron tossing game, this pa-
per presents a novel SESAE. In the SESAE, if using any
d-bit segment binary key stream generated by a diﬀerent
seed to decrypt the ciphertext, then the decrypted plain-
text will become an avalanche-like text, that is, the text
has consecutive one’s with a probability (2d−1)/2d assum-
ing that the used PRNG is able to produce ideal d-segment
binary key streams.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents a novel SESAE, gives a deﬁnition of the ideal
PRNG, and shows a criterion theorem on avalanche ef-
fect. Section 3 introduces two novel chaotic 12-bit seg-
ment PRNGs and compares their randomness with an
RC4 12-bit segment PRNG and a Matlab 12-bit segment
PRNG via the F140-2 test. SESAE simulation experi-
ments on the four PRNGs are then compared. Further-
more the SESAE tests for 16-bit segment PRNGs similar
to the above four PRNGS are also compared. Finally, some
concluding remarks are presented in Section 4.
2 SESAE, ideal PRNG and criterion theorem
Two pseudorandom number binary sequences ({0, 1})
with d-bit segments generated via an ideal PRNG
with diﬀerent seeds or keys should have approximately
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(2d − 1)/2d × 100% diﬀerent bits. This property motives
us to propose a novel SESAE as follows.
Definition 1 (SESAE). Let P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} be
a binary key stream with d-bit segments generated by
a PRNG, M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} a binary plaintext
stream, and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn} a ciphertext stream.
Then, SESAE is described as follows.
(1) The ciphertext C = E(M,P) is determined by
ci =
{
pi if mi = 0,
∼ pi if mi = 1, (1)
where ∼ pi is deﬁned to be the bit string obtained by
replacing all 0s in pi with 1s, and all 1s in pi with 0s.
(2) The corresponding decrypted plaintext M =
E−1(C,P) is determined by
mi =
{
0 if ci = pi,
1 if ci = pi. (2)
Definition 2. A PRNG, S, which generates binary d-bit
key streams, is called an ideal PRNG, if S has the
following properties.
(1) The period of any key stream generated by the PRNG
is larger than 2d. Its seed space and key space are
larger than 2512.
(2) In one period of a pseudorandom key streams gener-
ated by the PRNG, the distributions of diﬀerent d-bit
segments in the key stream is homogenous. That is, if
the period p = n × 2d, then the number of each dif-
ferent d-bit segment is equal to n. If the the period p
is not an integer multiple of 2d, then the diﬀerence
between the numbers of diﬀerent d-bit segments is at
most one.
(3) The two key streams P1, P2 generated by any two dif-
ferent seeds have (2d − 1)/2d × 100% diﬀerent d-bit
segments.
Remark 1.
(1) The assumption on the long period guarantees that
the PRNG is suitable for encrypting long bit plain-
texts.
(2) The assumption on the large key and seed space guar-
antees that the PRNG is able to against brute-force
attacks.
Theorem 1. Let S be an ideal PRNG. Then, any en-
crypted plaintext using SESAE and any key stream gen-
erated by PRNG has avalanche eﬀect: if any key stream
generated by diﬀerent seeds is used to decrypt an en-
crypted plaintext, then consecutive ones will appear in the
decrypted text with a probability of (2d − 1)/2d.
Proof. Let P ,M and C be deﬁned by Deﬁnition 1. Denote
P˜ = {p˜1, p˜2, . . . , p˜n} to be another key stream generated
by the ideal PRNG with a diﬀerent seed. Then, by the
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Since the distributions of diﬀerent d-bit segments in P˜ are
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Consequently, if one uses the key stream P˜ to decrypt the
ciphertext C, consecutive ones will appear in the decrypted
text with a probability of (2d − 1)/2d. This completes the
proof.
Remark 2. If the plaintext is an RGB image, then the de-
crypted image becomes a pure white image with a proba-
bility ≤(2d−1)/2d because one color pixel may have more
than one brightness code which is less than 255.
In order to prevent opponents’ attacks, one can
propose a “one-time-pad” scheme as follows.
Let X be a set in the key and seed space of a PRNG,
and assume that Alice and Bob share a one-to-one map-
ping f : X → X . The sender (Alice or Bob) selects ran-
domly an element x ∈ X and send it to the receiver. Then,
they can use f(x) as key and seed for one-time encryption.
Remark 3. This scheme is easily realized for chaos-based
PRNGs because their key and seed spaces are subsets
of Rn, and such mappings are easily constructed. Con-
sequently, opponents have to use brute-force attacks to
decrypt ciphertexts, which is almost impossible since the
key and seed space is lager than 2512. Even if the key size
is 2128 bits, the time required at 106 encryptions/μS is
6.4× 106 years [11].
3 PRNGs, randomness tests and simulation
experiments on SESAE
In the ﬁrst two subsections, two 12-bit segment chaotic
PRNGs based on a discrete Chua circuit and a discrete
Chen equation are considered, aiming to illustrate the ef-
fectiveness of the above theoretical results in computer
simulations, and implement SESAE experiments. In Sec-
tion 3.3, the RC4 PRNG and the Matlab PRNG (pseu-
dorandom algorithm) are also used with SESAE for com-
paring avalanche eﬀects using the two chaotic PRNGs.
Section 3.4 compares the SESAE tests for 16-bit segment
PRNGs similar to the above four PRNGs.
3.1 Chua circuit based PRNG, F140 test
and experiments on SESAE
3.1.1 Discrete Chua circuit
Based on the third-order Chua circuit [12], and a smooth
Chua circuit [13], a six-order discrete Chua circuit is
introduced with a generalized synchronization property.
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The driving part of the discrete Chua circuit has the
following form:
X(k + 1) =
⎡











y(k) + [x(k)− y(k) + z(k)]
z(k) + [−βy(k)− γz(k)],
(3)
where α = 10, β = 15, γ = 0.01, a = −2, b = −0.78,
 = 0.05, u =
√
27.
The driven part has the following form:
Y(k + 1) =
⎡














is an invertible matrix. From Theorem 1 in [14], it follows
that systems (3) and (4) are in generalized synchronization
with respect to the transformation H(·) = (h1(·), h2(·),
h3(·))T = A : R3 → R3.
The calculated Lyapunov exponents of system (3) are
0.00042, 0, 0.0030. Therefore, systems (3) is chaotic. Since
systems (3) and (4) are in generalized synchronization
with the transformation H , and H is invertible, system (4)
is also chaotic. Furthermore, the orbits of a chaotic system
are sensitive to the initial conditions of the system, and
the invertible transformation H is continuous, the orbits
of system (4) are also sensitive to the initial conditions of
the system.
Now, select the following initial conditions:
x(0) = 0.2, y(0) = 0.2, z(0) = 0.2; (6)
Y(0) = AX(0) + 1. (7)
The chaotic orbits of the state variables X(k) and Y(k) for
the ﬁrst 10 000 iterations are shown in Figures 1a and 1b.
Observe that the dynamic orbits of the driving system are
similar to those of the third-order Chua circuit [12].
Figures 2a–2c show that although the initial condi-
tion (7) has a perturbation, X(k) and Y(k) are rapidly
conversing into generalized synchronization as the theory
(Theorem 1 in [14]) predicts.
3.1.2 Generalized FIPS140-2 test
The FIPS 140-2 test issued by the American National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology [15] has been widely

























Fig. 1. (Color online) Chaotic orbits of the state variables:































Fig. 2. (Color online) The state vectors X and Y are in gener-
alized synchronization with respect to the transformation H .
(a) h1(X)(k)-y1(k), (b) h2(X)(k)-y2(k), (c) h3(X)(k)-y3(k).
Table 1. The required intervals of the FIPS 140-2 Monobit
test, Pork tests, Run test. Here, MT, PT, and LT represent
the Monobit test, the Pork test and the Long Run test, respec-
tively. k represents the length of the run of a tested sequence.
χ2 DT represents χ2 distribution.
Test FIPS 140-2 α = 10−4 Golomb’s
Item Required intervals Required intervals Postulates
MT 9725−10 275 9725−10 275 10 000
PT 2.16−46.17 2.16−46.17 χ2 DT
LT <26 <26 –
k Run Test Run test
1 2315−2685 2362−2638 2500
2 1114−1386 1153−1347 1250
3 527−723 556−694 625
4 240−384 264−361 313
5 103−209 122−191 156
6+ 103−209 122−191 156
used for verifying the statistical properties of the random-
ness of the pseudo-random numbers generated by PRNGs.
The FIPS 140-2 test consists of four sub-tests: Monobit
test, Poker test, Run test and Long Run test. Each test
needs a single stream of 20 000 one and zero bits from the
keystream generator. Any failure in the ﬁrst three tests
means that the corresponding quantity of the sequences
falls out the required intervals listed in the second column
in Table 1. The Long Run test is passed if there are no
runs of length 26 or more.
Based on the FIPS 140-2 test and the Golomb’s
three postulates on the randomness that pseudorandom
sequences should satisfy [16], a conference paper [17]
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has proposed the Monobit test, Pork test, Run test and
Longest Run test for d-bit segment binary sequence case:
(1) Change the d-bit binary sequence  with length n into
its corresponding decimal number sequence {0, 1, . . . ,
2d − 1}n. Denote the sequence by:
 = 12 . . . n. (8)
(2) For any i ∈ , denote 2d − 1− i by ∼ i.
(3) For each ﬁxed i, taking i and ∼ i consecutively
from , we obtain 2d/2 new sequences and denote
them by:
Ei = En1En2 . . . Eni , i = 1, 2, . . . , 2
d/2. (9)
(4) For any ﬁxed i and Ei, replace i ∈ Ei by 0, and ∼ i
by 1. Denote the new sequences by:
˜i = ˜n1 ˜n2 . . . ˜ni , i = 1, . . . , 2
d/2. (10)
(5) For the case of n = 10 000× 2d, one can use the FIPS
140-2 suite to test the {0, 1} sequence ˜′is. If taken
signiﬁcant level α = 0.0001, the required intervals for
the tests are listed in the third column in Table 1
(see [17] for detail).
According to Golomb’s three postulates [16], the ideal val-
ues of the Monobit test and the Run test are listed in the
4th column in Table 1.
3.1.3 A novel PRNG and generalized FIPS140-2 test
Let
y1(k), y2(k), y3(k), k = 1, . . . , N
be a chaotic stream generated by the discrete Chua
circuit (4). Denote
YN = {y1(i) + y2(i) + y3(i)|i = 1, 2, . . . , N}, (11)
normal(YN ) = YN −min(YN )max(YN )−min(YN ) . (12)
Let L = 12 and T be a transformation form Z+ to binary
bits. Then, one has a binary sequence with L×N bits:
P = T (normal(YN ))
= mod(round(1016 × normal(YN )), 2L). (13)
Consequently, a novel chaotic PRNG (called PRNG I) is
constructed via equations (3)–(7) and (11)–(13).
Remark 4. The perturbed initial conditions ((6) and (7))
and the perturbed matrix A deﬁned by (5) can be used
as keys of PRNG I. The perturbed initial conditions can
also be used as seeds of PRNG I.
Table 2. The tested Mean ± SD of all E′is deﬁned by (9)
for the 100 key streams with length 10 000× 212 generated by
PRNG I and RC4 PRNG, respectively. Here, MT, PT, and
LT represent the Monobit test, Pork test and Long Run test,
respectively; k represents the length of the run of a tested
sequence.
Test Bits PRNG I RC4
item {εi,∼ εi} Mean ± SD Mean ± SD
MT
εi 10 000± 247.8 10 000 ± 100.00
∼εi 9999.8 ± 247.55 10 000 ± 99.80
PT – 15.01 ± 5.49 25.352 ± 8.47
LT
εi 13.65 ± 1.9312 13.62 ± 1.87
∼εi 13.66 ± 1.9264 13.62 ± 1.87
k Run test
1
εi 2490.3 ± 74.968 2499.9 ± 50.3
∼εi 2490.4 ± 75.2381 2499.9 ± 50.05
2
εi 1246.7 ± 32.974 1250.1 ± 33.06
∼εi 1246.8 ± 32.991 1250.0 ± 33.11
3
εi 624.54 ± 27.236 624.87 ± 23.37
∼εi 624.45 ± 27.21 624.91 ± 23.45
4
εi 312.85 ± 21.938 312.44 ± 16.84
∼εi 312.80 ± 21.918 312.48 ± 16.81
5
εi 156.84 ± 16.154 156.23 ± 12.12
∼εi 156.82 ± 16.138 156.21 ± 12.10
6+
εi 157.84 ± 21.404 156.21 ± 11.88
∼εi 157.82 ± 21.4332 156.13 ± 11.819
Now, select the following initial conditions:
[x(0), y(0), z(0)]T = [1.2658, 0.7821, 0.0867]T (14)
Y(0) = AX(0) + 1. (15)
The FIPS 140-2 test is used to check 100 12-bit segment
binary keystreams with length 10 000× 212 generated by
PRNG I with perturbed randomly initial conditions (14)
and (15), and the elements of matrix (5) in the range
|| ∈ [10−16, 10−13].
Calculate the mean value (denoted by Mean) and the
standard deviation (denoted by SD) of the FIPS 140-2
tests to all E′is deﬁned by (9) for the 100 key streams. The
results are shown in the 3th column in Table 2. Observe
that the mean values of all tested items are very close to
the corresponding ideal values listed in the 4th column in
Table 1.
3.1.4 RC4 algorithm based PRNG and FIPS140-2 test
The RC4 was designed by Rivest of the RSA Security in
1987, which has been widely used in popular protocols
such as Secure Sockets. The RC4 Algorithm based 12-bit
segment PRNG can be designed via Matlab commands:
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L=12; N = 10000∗2ˆL ;
K=randint (1 ,2ˆL , [ 0 2 ˆ L−1 ] ) ;
S=[0 :2ˆL−1] ; j =0;
f o r i =1:2ˆL
j=mod( j+S( i )+K( i ) ,2ˆL ) ;
Sk=S( j +1);
S ( j+1)=S( i ) ;
S ( i )=Sk ;
end
C=zero s (1 ,N) ; j =0; i =0; k=1;
f o r l =1:N
i=mod( i +1 ,2ˆL ) ;
j=mod( j+S( i +1) ,2ˆL ) ;
Sk=S( j +1);
S( j+1)=S( i +1);
S ( i+1)=Sk ;
C( l )=S(mod(S( j+1)+S( i +1) ,2ˆL)+1);
end
Here, “2∧L” represents 2L; “randint(1,2∧L,[0 2∧L-1])”
generates a vector of uniformly distributed random in-
tegers {0, 1, . . . , 2L − 1} of dimension 2L; “mod” means
modulus after division; “zeros(1,N)” is a zero raw vector
of dimension N .
Let T be a transformation form Z+ to binary bits.
Then, one has a binary sequence with L×N bits:
P = T (C).
Consequently, the RC4 Algorithm based 12-bit segment
PRNG is designed.
Remark 5. The randomly chosen K=randint(1,2∧L,[0
2∧L-1]) can be used as keys of RC PRNG.
The FIPS 140-2 test is used to check 100 12-bit
segment binary keystreams with length N = 10 000× 212
generated by RC4 PRNG with perturbed randomly
key K.
Calculate the mean value and the standard deviation
of the FIPS 140-2 tests to all E′is deﬁned by (9) for the
100 key streams. The results are shown in the 4th column
in Table 2.
Observe that the mean values of all tested items are
very close to the corresponding ideal values listed in the
4th column in Table 1. The results for the Monobit test,
the one-run test and the “large than 5-run” test for RC4
PRNG are better than those of PRNG I.
3.1.5 Simulations on SESAE
Now, the avalanche eﬀect of SESAE is investigated, which
is used to encrypt and decrypt an RGB image Flowers
with 167 × 121 pixels as shown in Figure 3a based on
PRNG I.
The simulation is implemented via the Matlab 7.1
platform on a PC computer.
(1) Transform the image Flowers to a binary plaintext
steamM = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn}, where n = 167×121×
3× 8.
(2) Use PRNG I with initial conditions (6) and (7) to
generate a 12-bit segment key stream with length n:
P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn}.
(3) Use formula (1), after dropping the ﬁrst 10 000 itera-
tive values of the key stream P , to encrypt the plain-
text steam M, and obtain a ciphertext C = E(M,P).
(4) Drop the ﬁrst 10 000 iterative values (see (3) and (4)).
Use formula (2) to decrypt the ciphertext and obtain
a decrypted plaintext image M¯ = E−1(C,P) without
errors.
(5) Randomly disturb the initial conditions (14) and (15),
and matrix (5), for 1000 times in the range || ∈
[10−16, 10−13], to obtain key streams (dropping the
ﬁrst 10,000 iterative values):
Pi, i = 1, 2, . . . , 1000.
(6) Use {P1, . . . ,P1000} to decrypt the ciphertext and ob-
tain decrypted plaintext, respectively:
M¯i = E−1(C,Pi), i = 1, . . . , 1000.
After changing M¯i to RGB images, all images become al-
most pure white images. There are total of 484 968 {0, 1}
codes in each decrypted image. Among the decrypted im-
ages, the minimum number of ‘0’s in the decrypted images
is 88, and the maximum one is 152. The two decrypted im-
ages (denoted by I88,1 and I152,1) are shown in Figure 31.
Denote Ii,j to be the jth image with number i of 0
codes. Table 3 lists the static data of the ﬁrst 10 im-
ages with minimum ‘0’s codes and the last 10 decrypted
images with maximum ‘0’s codes. Here N1 and N2 rep-
resent the number of ‘0’s and the number of the color
pixels with brightness less than 255, respectively; Mean
represents the average brightness of color pixels in the
decrypted images; Percentage represents the percentage
of the 1 codes in the decrypted image. Observe that the
percentages of the numbers of “1” codes are in the rang
[99.9687, 99.9819], which is very close to the ideal value
(212 − 1)/212 = 99.9756.
Table 4 lists some statistical data of the perturbed
keys corresponding to the above ten decrypted images.
The results may suggest that there are no signiﬁcant cor-
relations between the perturbed parameters and the de-
crypted images if the perturbation || is larger than 10−16.
In summary, the simulation shows that using PRNG
I and SESAE to encrypt RGB images is able to generate
encrypted images with signiﬁcant avalanche eﬀects. The
key space of PRNG I may be larger than 1015×15 > 2747 2.
1 In order to make the pixels whose brightness is less than
255 be visible in the decrypted images, hereafter we reduce
the brightness of the three color planes of these pixels by 100,
respectively.
2 It can be proved that if perturbing the elements of ma-
trix (5) in the range || ∈ [10−16, 10−1], the perturbed matrices
are still invertible.




Fig. 3. (Color online) (a) Original image Flowers. Two de-
crypted images via key streams generated with slightly per-
turbed initial conditions and system parameters in the range
[10−16, 10−13]: (b) I88,1, and (c) I152,1.
3.2 Chen equation based PRNG, FIPS140-2 test
and experiments on SESAE
3.2.1 Discrete Chen system
Based on the third-order Chen system [18], a six-order
discrete Chen system is introduced through generalized
synchronization.
Table 3. The static data of the ﬁrst 10 images with minimum
‘0’s codes and the last 10 decrypted images with maximum ‘0’s
codes. Here N1 and N2 represent the number of ‘0’s and the
number of the color pixels with brightness less than 255, respec-
tively; Mean represents the average brightness of color pixels
in the decrypted images; Percentage represents the percentage
of the 1 codes in the decrypted image.
Images N1 N1 Mean Percentage
I88,1 88 88 254.9503 99.9819
I89,1 89 89 254.9516 99.9816
I89,2 89 88 254.9493 99.9816
I91,1 91 91 254.9555 99.9812
I92,1 92 92 254.9417 99.9810
I94,1 94 94 254.9485 99.9806
I94,2 94 93 254.9566 99.9806
I95,1 95 95 254.9438 99.9804
I95,2 95 95 254.9531 99.9804
I95,3 95 95 254.9377 99.9804
I145,1 145 145 254.9187 99.9701
I146,1 146 146 254.9215 99.9699
I146,2 146 146 254.9207 99.9699
I147,1 147 147 254.9325 99.9697
I147,2 147 147 254.9146 99.9697
I147,3 147 147 254.9179 99.9697
I148,1 148 148 254.9416 99.9695
I148,2 148 148 254.9306 99.9695
I149,1 149 148 254.9380 99.9693
I152,1 152 152 254.9154 99.9687
The driving part of the discrete Chen system has the
following form:
X(k + 1) =
⎡







x1(k) + a[x2(k)− x1(k)]
x2(k) + [(c− a)x1(k)− x1(k)x3(k)
+ cx2(k)]
x3(k) + [x1(k)x2(k)− bx3(k)],
(16)
where a = 35, b = 3, c = 28,  = 0.01.
The driven system has the following form:
Y(k + 1) =
⎡













is an invertible matrix. The calculated Lyapunov expo-
nents of system (16) are {0.0017, 0,−1.0115}. From Theo-
rem 1 given in [14], one knows that systems (16) and (17)
can achieve generalized synchronization with respect to
the transformation H = A: R3 → R3. Hence systems (16)
and (17) are chaotic and sensitive to the initial conditions
of the two systems.
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Table 4. The minimums, means, and maximums in absolute
values of the 15 perturbed parameters corresponding to 20
chaotic steams used for decrypted images I ′i,js.
Images Min (×10−13) Mean (×10−13) Max (×10−13)
I88,1 0.0787 0.6513 0.9963
I89,1 0.0314 0.4850 0.9660
I89,2 0.0842 0.5566 0.9511
I91,1 0.0088 0.4661 0.9805
I92,1 0.0231 0.4298 0.9923
I94,1 0.0186 0.4020 0.9091
I94,2 0.0826 0.4652 0.7953
I95,1 0.0000 0.4862 0.9389
I95,2 0.0411 0.4202 0.8797
I95,3 0.0055 0.4992 0.8460
I145,1 0.0157 0.5407 0.8511
I146,1 0.0016 0.4604 0.89539
I146,2 0.0703 0.5006 0.9767
I147,1 0.0775 0.4451 0.9990
I147,2 0.0420 0.4211 0.9773
I147,3 0.0065 0.5470 0.9780
I148,1 0.0866 0.4526 0.9151
I148,2 0.0038 0.4329 0.8624
I149,1 0.0145 0.4500 0.9310
I152,1 0.0202 0.4429 0.99637
Here, select the same initial conditions (6) and (7)
given in the discrete Chua circuit. The chaotic orbits of the
state vectors X(k) and Y(k) for the ﬁrst 10 000 iterations
are shown in Figures 4a and 4b, respectively. Observe that
the dynamic orbits of the driving system are similar to
those of the third-order Chen system.
Figures 5a–5c show that, although the initial condi-
tion (6) has a perturbation, X(k) and Y(k) are rapidly
converging into generalized synchronization as the theory
(Theorem 1 in [14]) predicts.
3.2.2 New PRNG and FIPS140-2 test
Let
y1(k), y2(k), y3(k), k = 1, . . . , N
be chaotic streams generated by the discrete Chen sys-
tem (17). Using formulas (12) and (13), one can design a
chaotic PRNG (called PRNG II).
Select the following initial conditions:
[x(0), y(0), z(0)]T=[−15.871, 2.9297, 13.913]T (19)
Y(0) = AX(0) + 1. (20)
The perturbed initial conditions (19), (20) and the per-
turbed matrix A deﬁned by (18) can be used as keys of
PRNG II. The perturbed initial conditions can also be
used as seeds of PRNG II.
The FIPS 140-2 test is used to check 100 12-bit seg-
ment binary keystreams with length 10 000 × 212 gener-
ated by PRNG II with perturbed randomly initial condi-
tions (19) and (20), and matrix (18) in the range || ∈
[10−16, 10−13].
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Fig. 4. (Color online) Chaotic orbits of the components of the
































Fig. 5. (Color online) The state vectors X and Y are in gen-
eralized synchronization with respect to the transformation
H . (a) h1(X)(k)-y1(k), (b) h2(X)(k)-y2(k), and (c) h3(X)(k)-
y3(k).
Calculate the mean value and the standard deviation
of the FIPS 140-2 tests to all E′is deﬁned by (9) for the 100
key streams. The results are shown in the 3th column in
Table 5. Observe that the mean values of all tested items
are very close to the corresponding ideal values listed in
the 4th column in Table 1.
3.2.3 Matlab algorithm based PRNG and FIPS140-2 test
Use matlab command randint(1,10000*2∧L,[0 2∧L-1])
where L = 12 generates 100 12-bit segment steams C1, . . . ,
C100.
Let T be a transformation form Z+ to binary bits.
Then, one has a binary sequence with L×N bits:
P = T (C).
Consequently, the Matlab Algorithm based 12-bit PRNG
is designed.
Then, use the FIPS 140-2 test to measure the 100 key
streams. Calculate the mean value and the standard devi-
ation of the FIPS 140-2 tests to all E′is deﬁned by (9) for
the 100 key streams. The results are shown in the 4th col-
umn in Table 5. Observe that the means of all tested items
are very close to the corresponding ideal values listed in
the 4th column in Table 1. The results for the Monobit test
and the one-run test are better than those of PRNG II.
3.2.4 Simulations on SESAE
Now, the avalanche eﬀect of SESAE is investigated, which
encrypts and decrypts the image Lina with 128×128 pixels
shown in Figure 6a, using PRNG II. The simulation is
implemented by Matlab 7.1 on a PC.
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Table 5. The tested Mean ± SD of all E′is deﬁned by (9)
for the 100 key streams with length 10 000 × 212 generated
by PRNG I, and Matlab PRNG, respectively. Here, MT, PT,
and LT represent the Monobit test, Pork test and Long Run
test, respectively; k represents the length of the run of a tested
sequence.
Test bits PRNG II Matlab
item {εi,∼εi} Mean ± SD Mean ± SD
MT
εi 9992.9 ± 283.53 9999.5 ± 100.02
∼εi 9993.1 ± 283.38 10, 000± 100.27
PT – 15.013 ± 5.5039 15.045 ± 5.4757
LT
εi 13.616 ± 1.9149 13.60 ± 1.8675
∼εi 13.621 ± 1.9176 13.63 ± 1.8783
k Run test
1
εi 2498.1 ± 83.056 2499.8 ± 49.765
∼εi 2498.1 ± 83.059 2499.7 ± 49.742
2
εi 1249± 46.733 1249.8 ± 33.313
∼εi 1249 ± 46.821 1249.8 ± 33.587
3
εi 624.43 ± 28.709 625.13 ± 23.499
∼εi 624.55 ± 28.665 624.8 ± 23.237
4
εi 312.26 ± 18.755 312.22 ± 16.907
∼εi 312.26 ± 18.762 312.52 ± 16.891
5
εi 156.12 ± 12.794 156.2 ± 12.092
∼εi 156.12 ± 12.782 156.2 ± 12.092
6+
εi 156.11 ± 12.676 156.34 ± 11.906
∼εi 156.09 ± 12.676 156.38 ± 11.982
(1) Transfer the image Lina to a binary plaintext steam
M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn}, where n = 128× 128× 3× 8.
(2) Use PRNG II with initial conditions (19)
and (20) to generate a 12-bit segment key stream
P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn}.
(3) Use formula (1) and the key stream P to encrypt
the plaintext steam M, and obtain a ciphertext
C = E(M,P).
(4) Drop the ﬁrst 10 000 iterative values (see (16) and
(17)). Using formula (2) and the key stream to de-
crypt the ciphertext, and obtain a decrypted plaintext
image M¯ = E−1(C,P) without errors.
(5) Randomly disturb the initial conditions (19) and (20),
and matrix (18) for 1000 times in the range || ∈
[10−16, 10−14], and obtain key streams (dropping the
ﬁrst 10 000 iterative values):
Pi, i = 1, 2, . . . , 1000.
(6) Use {P1, . . . ,P1000} to decrypt the ciphertext, and ob-
tain the decrypted plaintext:
M¯i = E−1(C,Pi), i = 1, . . . , 1000.
(7) Change M¯i to RGB images.
After changing M¯i to RGB images, all images become al-
most pure white images. There are total of 393 216 {0, 1}
codes in each decrypted image. Among the decrypted im-
ages, the minimum number of ‘0’s in the decrypted is 69,
and the maximum one is 131. The two decrypted im-





Fig. 6. (Color online) (a) Original image Lena. Two de-
crypted images via key streams generated with slightly per-
turbed initial conditions and system parameters in the range
[10−16, 10−13]: (b) I69,1, and (c) I131,1.
Denote Ii,j to be the jth image with number i of 0
codes. Table 6 lists the static data of the ﬁrst 10 im-
ages with minimum ‘0’s codes and the last 10 decrypted
images with maximum ‘0’s codes. Here N1 and N2 rep-
resent the number of ‘0’s and the number of the color
pixels with brightness less than 255, respectively; Mean
represents the average brightness of color pixels in the
decrypted images; Percentage represents the percentage
the 1 codes in the decrypted image. Observe that the
percentages of the numbers of “1” codes are in the rang
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Table 6. The static data of the ﬁrst 10 images with minimum
‘0’s codes and the last 10 decrypted images with maximum ‘0’s
codes. Here N1 and N2 represent the number of ‘0’s and the
number of the color pixels with brightness less than 255, respec-
tively; Mean represents the average brightness of color pixels
in the decrypted images; Mercentage represents the percentage
of the 1 codes in the decrypted image.
Images N1 N1 Mean Percentage
I69,1 69 69 254.9636 99.9825
I71,1 71 71 254.9600 99.9819
I71,2 71 71 254.9402 99.9819
I71,3 71 71 254.9535 99.9819
I73,1 73 73 254.9536 99.9814
I73,2 73 73 254.9578 99.9814
I75,1 75 75 254.9499 99.9809
I75,2 75 75 254.9441 99.9809
I75,3 75 75 254.9501 99.9809
I76,1 76 76 254.9543 99.9807
I121,1 121 119 254.9024 99.9692
I122,1 122 122 254.9130 99.9690
I122,2 122 121 254.9184 99.9690
I122,3 122 121 254.9152 99.9690
I125,1 125 125 254.9249 99.9682
I125,2 125 125 254.9120 99.9682
I125,3 125 125 254.9300 99.9682
I127,1 127 127 254.9094 99.9677
I128,1 128 128 254.9189 99.9674
I131,1 131 131 254.9229 99.9667
[99.9667, 99.9825], which is very close to the ideal value
(212 − 1)/212 = 99.9756.
Table 7 lists some statistical data of the perturbed
keys corresponding to the above ten decrypted images.
The results may suggest that there are no signiﬁcant cor-
relations between the perturbed parameters and the de-
crypted images if the perturbation || is larger than 10−16.
In summary, the simulation shows that using PRNG
II and SESAE to encrypt RGB images is able to generate
encrypted images with signiﬁcant avalanche eﬀects. The
key space of PRNG II may be larger than 1015×15 > 2747 3.
3.3 Simulations on other PRNGs on SESAE
3.3.1 Simulation using RC4 PRNG on SESAE
Now the RC4 PRNG (algorithm) described in Sec-
tion 3.1.4 is used with SESAE to encrypt and decrypt
the image Lina.
(1) In the RC4 algorithm, select a seed K0 = K =
randint (1,2∧L,[0 2∧L-1]) where L = 12, and let
l = 167× 121× 3× 8, to obtain a chaotic stream C.
(2) Change C to a 12-bit segment binary key steam P .
(3) Use formula (1) and the key stream P to encrypt the
plaintext steam M, generated by the image Flowers,
and obtain a ciphertext C = E(M,P).
3 It can be proved that if perturbing the elements of ma-
trix (18) in the range || ∈ [10−16, 10−1], the perturbed matri-
ces are still invertible.
Table 7. The minimums, means, and maximums in absolute
values of the 15 perturbed parameters corresponding to 20
chaotic steams used for decrypted images I ′i,js.
Images Min (×10−13) Mean (×10−13) Max (×10−13)
I69,1 0.1502 0.5710 0.9800
I71,1 0.3604 0.6789 0.9437
I71,2 0.0264 0.4867 0.9998
I71,3 0.0291 0.4556 0.8914
I73,1 0.1402 0.4652 0.9608
I73,2 0.0334 0.5669 0.9993
I75,1 0.0208 0.4474 0.8797
I75,2 0.0053 0.4624 0.9503
I75,3 0.0304 0.4545 0.9907
I76,1 0.0821 0.4417 0.9051
I121,1 0.0108 0.4592 0.9973
I122,1 0.0613 0.2772 0.6648
I122,2 0.0325 0.5335 0.8152
I122,3 0.0393 0.5174 0.8720
I125,1 0.0410 0.4574 0.9815
I125,2 0.0166 0.6666 0.9675
I125,3 0.0131 0.5171 0.9796
I127,1 0.0924 0.5303 0.8916
I128,1 0.0327 0.4638 0.9672
I131,1 0.0295 0.4522 0.9776
(4) Again, use Matlab command K = randint(1,2∧L,[0
2∧L-1]) to generate 1000 12-bit segment binary key
steams:
Pi, i = 1, 2, . . . , 1000.
(5) Use {P1, . . . ,P1000} to decrypt the ciphertext C, and
obtaining the decrypted plaintext:
M¯i = E−1(C,Pi), i = 1, . . . , 1000.
(6) Change M¯i to RGB images.
Totally 1000 images become almost pure white colored
images. There are total of 484 968 {0, 1} codes in each
decrypted image. Among the decrypted images, the min-
imum number of ‘0’s in the decrypted is 69, and the
maximum one is 131. The two decrypted images (de-
noted by I80,1 and I149,1) are shown in Figures 7a and 7b,
respectively.
Denote Ii,j to be the jth image with number i of 0
codes. Table 8 lists the static data of the ﬁrst 10 im-
ages with minimum ‘0’s codes and the last 10 decrypted
images with maximum ‘0’s codes. Here N1 and N2 rep-
resent the number of ‘0’s and the number of the color
pixels with brightness less than 255, respectively; Mean
represents the average brightness of color pixels in the
decrypted images; Percentage represents the percentage
of the 1 codes in the decrypted image. Observe that the
percentages of the numbers of “1” codes are in the rang
[99.9693, 99.9835], which is very close to the ideal value
(212 − 1)/212 = 99.9756.
Table 9 lists some statistical data of the perturbed keys
corresponding to the above ten decrypted images. The re-
sults may suggest that there are no signiﬁcant correla-
tions between the perturbed K values and the decrypted
images.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 7. (Color online) Two decrypted images via key streams
generated perturbed K80,1 and K149,1: (a) I80,1, and (b) I149,1.
The above results suggest that using diﬀerent key
stream to decrypt images do not provide useful informa-
tion on both the original image Flowers and the original
seed K0.
In summary, the simulation shows that using RC4
PRNG with SESAE to encrypt RGB images is able to
generate images with signiﬁcant avalanche eﬀects.
Remark 6. Comparing Table 3 with Table 8 shows that
the SESAEs generated by PRNG I and RC4 PRNG do
not have signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
3.3.2 Simulation using Matlab PRNG on SESAE
For comparison, the Matlab PRNG is used with SESAE
to perform the same simulations.
(1) Use Matlab command randint(128 ∗ 128 ∗ 3 ∗ 8, 12) to
generate a 12-bit segment binary key steam P .
(2) Use formula (1) and the key stream P to encrypt the
plaintext steam M generated by the image Lina, and
obtain a ciphertext C = E(M,P).
(3) Again use Matlab command randint(128∗128∗3∗8, 12)
to generate 1000 12-bit segment binary key steam:
Pi, i = 1, 2, . . . , 1000.
(4) Use {P1, . . . ,P1000} to decrypt the ciphertext C, and
obtain the decrypted plaintext:
M¯i = E−1(C,Pi), i = 1, . . . , 1000.
Table 8. The static data of the ﬁrst 10 images with minimum
‘0’s codes and the last 10 decrypted images with maximum ‘0’s
codes. Here N1 and N2 represent the number of ‘0’s and the
number of the color pixels with brightness less than 255, respec-
tively; Mean represents the average brightness of color pixels
in the decrypted images; Percentage represents the percentage
of the 1 codes in the decrypted image.
Images N1 N1 Mean Percentage
I80,1 80 80 254.9642 99.9835
I91,1 91 91 254.9510 99.9812
I94,1 94 94 254.9642 99.9806
I95,1 95 95 254.9573 99.9804
I96,1 96 96 254.9437 99.9802
I96,2 96 95 254.9444 99.9802
I97,1 97 97 254.9445 99.9800
I97,2 97 97 254.9555 99.9800
I97,3 97 97 254.9576 99.9800
I98,1 98 98 254.9502 99.9798
I143,1 143 143 254.9194 99.9705
I144,1 144 144 254.9097 99.9703
I144,2 144 144 254.9172 99.9703
I144,3 144 144 254.9092 99.9703
I145,1 145 145 254.9254 99.9701
I146,1 146 146 254.9063 99.9699
I147,1 147 147 254.9289 99.9697
I147,2 147 147 254.9204 99.9697
I148,1 148 148 254.9256 99.9695
I149,1 149 149 254.9236 99.9693
Table 9. The diﬀerences between the original seed K0 and the
seeds Kj,i are measured by norm ‖K0 −Kj,i‖.
‖K0 −Kj,i‖ (×105)
K80,1 K91,1 K94,1 K95,1 K96,1
K0 1.0743 1.0555 1.0844 1.0577 1.0782
K96,2 K97,1 K97,2 K97,3 K98,1
K0 1.0701 1.0652 1.0801 1.0764 1.0543
K143,1 K144,1 K144,2 K143,3 K145,1
K0 1.0791 1.0715 1.0588 1.0742 1.0803
K146,2 K147,1 K147,2 K148,1 K149,1
K0 1.0865 1.0657 1.0561 1.0758 1.0841
(5) Change M¯i to RGB images.
Totally 1000 images become almost pure white colored
images. There are total of 393 216 {0, 1} codes in each
decrypted image. Among the decrypted images, the min-
imum number of ‘0’s in the decrypted images is 66, and
the maximum one is 124. The two decrypted images (de-
noted by I66,1 and I124,1) are shown in Figures 8a and 8b,
respectively. The decrypted images show avalanche eﬀects.
Denote Ii,j to be the jth image with number i of 0
codes. Table 10 lists the static data of the ﬁrst 10 im-
ages with minimum ‘0’s codes and the last 10 decrypted
images with maximum ‘0’s codes. Here N1 and N2 rep-
resent the number of ‘0’s and the number of the color
pixels with brightness less than 255, respectively; Mean
represents the average brightness of color pixels in the
decrypted images; Percentage represents the percentage
the 1 codes in the decrypted image. Observe that the
percentages of the numbers of “1” codes are in the rang
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 8. (Color online) Two decrypted images via key streams
generated with diﬀerent key streams generated by the Matlab
PRNG: (a) I66,1, and (b) I124,1.
[99.9685, 99.9832], which is very close to the ideal value
(212 − 1)/212 = 99.9756.
Table 11 lists some statistical data of the norms be-
tween the original key stream S0 and the key stream Si,j
used in the above ten decrypted images, respectively. The
results may suggest that there are no signiﬁcant correla-
tions between the norm and the corresponding decrypted
image.
In summary, the simulations show that using Matlab
PRNG with SESAE to encrypt RGB images is able to
generate images with signiﬁcant avalanche eﬀects.
Remark 7. Comparing Table 6 with Table 10 shows that
the SESAEs generated by PRNG II and Matlab PRNG
do not have signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
3.4 SESAE experiments for 16-bit segment PRNGs
This subsection implements some SESAE experiments for
16-bit segment PRNGs.
Table 10. The static data of the ﬁrst 10 images with minimum
‘0’s codes and the last 10 decrypted images with maximum ‘0’s
codes. Here N1 and N2 represent the number of ‘0’s and the
number of the color pixels with brightness less than 255, respec-
tively; Mean represents the average brightness of color pixels
in the decrypted images; Percentage represents the percentage
of the 1 codes in the decrypted image.
Images N1 N1 Mean Percentage
I66,1 66 66 254.9565 99.9832
I67,1 67 67 254.9606 99.9830
I70,1 70 70 254.9349 99.9822
I70,2 70 70 254.9552 99.9822
I70,3 70 70 254.9633 99.9822
I71,1 71 71 254.9550 99.9819
I71,2 71 71 254.9606 99.9819
I71,3 71 71 254.9503 99.9819
I73,1 73 73 254.9504 99.9814
I73,2 73 73 254.9610 99.9814
I118,1 118 118 254.9347 99.9700
I119,1 119 119 254.9260 99.9697
I119,2 119 119 254.9139 99.9697
I120,1 120 120 254.9154 99.9695
I120,2 120 120 254.9328 99.9695
I120,3 120 120 254.9395 99.9695
I121,1 121 121 254.9283 99.9692
I123,1 122 122 254.9305 99.9687
I123,2 123 123 254.9286 99.9687
I124,1 124 124 254.9113 99.9685
Table 11. The diﬀerences between the original keystream S0
and the keystreams S ′j,is are measured by norm ‖S0 − Sj,i‖.
‖S0 − Sj,i‖ (×106)
S66,1 S67,1 S70,1 S70,2 S70,3
S0 1.0743 1.0555 1.0844 1.0577 1.0782
S71,1 S71,2 S71,3 S73,1 S73,2
S0 1.0701 1.0652 1.0801 1.0764 1.0543
S118,1 S119,1 S119,2 S120,1 S120,2
S0 1.0791 1.0715 1.0588 1.0742 1.0803
S120,3 S121,1 S123,1 S123,2 S124,1
S0 1.0865 1.0657 1.0561 1.0758 1.0841
Now let the parameter L in the four PRNGs described
in Sections 3.1.3, 3.1.4, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 be equal to 16.
Then one obtains four 16-bit segment PRNSs.
Using the same conditions given in the four subsections
encrypts the images Flowers and Lina, and then using
1000 key streams generated by diﬀerent keys decrypts the
encrypted images by the original key stream, respectively.
The results are given as follows.
(1) The total 1000 images (Flowers) decrypted by the key
stream generated by 16-bit segment PRNG I become
almost pure ones. Among the decrypted images, the
minimum number of ‘0’s in the decrypted images is 1,
and the maximum one is 11. Therefore the percentages
of the numbers of “1” codes are in the rang [0.99998
0.99999], which is very close to the ideal value (216 −
1)/216 = 0.99998. The two decrypted images (denoted
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 9. (Color online) Two decrypted images via key streams
generated with diﬀerent key streams generated by the 16-bit
segment PRNG I: (a) I1,1, and (b) I11,1.
by I1,1 and I11,1) are shown in Figure 9. The decrypted
images show strong avalanche eﬀects.
(2) The total 1000 images (Flowers) decrypted by the key
stream generated by RC4 16-bit segment PRNG be-
come almost pure ones. Among the decrypted images,
the minimum number of ‘0’s in the decrypted im-
ages is 1, and the maximum one number of ‘0’s in
the decrypted images is 17. Therefore the percent-
ages of the numbers of “1” codes are in the rang
[0.99996,0.99999], which is very close to the ideal
value (216 − 1)/216 = 0.99998. The two decrypted
images (denoted by I1,1 and I17,1) are shown in Fig-
ure 10. The decrypted images show strong avalanche
eﬀects.
(3) The total 1000 images (Lina) decrypted by the key
stream generated by 16-bit segment PRNG II become
almost pure ones. Among the decrypted images, there
are ten images to become pure white ones. The max-
imum number of ‘0’s in the decrypted images is 10.
This image is denoted by I10,1. Therefore the per-
centages of the numbers of “1” codes are in the rang
[0.99998 1], which is in good agreement with the ideal
value (216 − 1)/216 = 0.99998. The image I10,1 is
shown in Figure 11. In summary, the strong avalanche
eﬀects appeared in the decrypted images.
(4) The total 1000 images decrypted by the key stream
generated by Matlab 16-bit segment PRNG become
(a)
(b)
Fig. 10. (Color online) Two decrypted images via key streams
generated with diﬀerent key streams generated by the 16-bit
segment RC4 PRNG (a) I1,1, and (b) I17,1.
Fig. 11. (Color online) Decrypted image I10,1 via key streams
generated with diﬀerent key streams generated by the 16-bit
segment PRNG II.
almost pure ones. Among the decrypted images, there
are three images to become pure white ones. The
maximum number of ‘0’s in the decrypted images is
16. Therefore the percentages of the numbers of “1”
codes are in the rang [0.99996, 1], which is very close
to the ideal value (216 − 1)/216 = 0.99998. One de-
crypted image with thirteen zero codes (denoted by
I16,1) is shown in Figure 12. The decrypted images
show strong avalanche eﬀects.
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Fig. 12. (Color online) Decrypted image I16,1 via key streams
generated with diﬀerent key stream generated by the 16-bit
segment Matlab PRNG.
4 Conclusions
This paper presents a novel d-bit segment stream encryp-
tion scheme with avalanche eﬀect (SESAE). The main fea-
ture of SESAE is to make each bit of the decrypted plain-
text changed to “1” with the probability of (2d − 1)/2d
when any seed of the key stream is changed, rather than
changed one-half as required by the traditional strict key
avalanche criterion [10]. As a cost, the required bits of the
ciphertext are d times those of the plaintext.
The deﬁnition of the ideal PRNG is introduced. An
ideal PRNG should generate homogenous and diﬀer-
ent d-bit segment binary key streams with probability
(2d − 1)/2d when using diﬀerent seeds.
The main advantage of SESAE is that the decrypted
ciphertext will become a monotone “white” text if a key
stream is used with diﬀerent seeds generated by an ideal
PRNG to decrypt the ciphertext. Therefore, the avalanche
eﬀect of SESAE is stronger than that of the traditional
ones.
The generalized FIPS140-2 tests have demonstrated
that the random performances of the two chaotic-based
PRNGs are not as good as those of RC4 PRNG and
Matlab PRNG. However the simulations have shown that
the encrypted RGB images via the two new chaotic
PRNGs, RC4 PRNG, and Maltab PRNG have the sim-
ilar signiﬁcant avalanche eﬀects, which are very close to
the ideal value (2d− 1)/2d%. The results suggest that the
four PRNGs are qualiﬁed candidates for SESAE.
The simulation results suggest that the SESAE re-
quirements for PRNGs are not as strict as those un-
der the traditional avalanche criteria. In fact, simulations
suggest that SESAE needs only those PRNGs that are
able to generate diﬀerent key streams with approximately
(2d − 1)/2d% bits.
The simulations also suggest that the key spaces of the
two chaotic PRNGs are both larger than 1015×15 > 2747,
which are large enough to against brute-force attacks.
Furthermore, the chaotic PRNGs are good to be used as
the “one-time-pad” scheme (see Remark 3). Consequently,
they are secure enough for practical applications.
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